car, and the fraction of high-school noncompleters by block groups. 4 Data on political contributions are from Bonica (2013) , which collects every contribution registered in the Federal Election Commission (FEC) public records and made by individuals or organizations to local, state, and federal elections from 1979 to 2012. I restrict attention to contributions made by individuals during the 2010-2012 election cycle. Each record contains a contributor's ID, along with the latitude and longitude of the contributor's address. 5 Because of geocoding approximation, address coordinates often correspond to points in front of (i.e., on the street), rather than inside, the parcels containing the addresses. For this reason, I use ArcGIS to assign each geocoded contribution to its closest parcel polygon. I then construct three outcomes: the parcel-level count of all individuals who made any FEC-recorded contribution; the count of contributors to Republican candidates to local, state, or federal offices; and the count of contributors to Democratic candidates. 6 Data on newspaper and magazine subscriptions were purchased from InfoUSA. InfoUSA uses a variety of sources, including actual subscription records from an undisclosed number of magazines and newspapers, to estimate the probability that individuals are currently subscribed to at least one magazine or newspaper. Each record contains the geocoded latitude and longitude of a likely subscriber's address. Similarly to FEC contributions, I match subscribers' address points to the nearest parcel polygons. Then, I use the total number of likely subscribers living in each parcel as outcome variable. The data were obtained in April 2015 and are updated as of that date.
C Sample Construction
Because my analysis is at the parcel level, precisely geocoding voter addresses is crucial to obtain reliable data. In fact, an imprecise address locator 7 could amass groups of geocoded addresses on the same parcel (e.g., consecutive house numbers on the same street) instead of assigning them to their actual, distinct lots. To maximize geocoding accuracy, I use a procedure called "address-point matching." 8 I start by standardizing voter addresses following the conventions used by Mass-GIS and Hennepin GIS for their address point shapefiles. 9 To identify the parcels where address points are located, I intersect address points and parcels shapefiles. I then match voters with the intersected address-points/parcels shapefile using address and precinct number. This produces a perfect match for more than 96 percent of voter addresses. Finally, I geocode unmatched addresses with Esri ® ArcGIS 2013 address locator and use Google StreetView to manually review and correct the location of the resulting output. Distances between polygons (e.g., a parcel and a polling place) are computed as the Euclidean, straight-line distance between the polygon centroids. Distances between parcels (or census blocks) and precinct boundaries are computed as the shortest straight-line distance from the parcel (or census block) centroid to the boundary. 10 Analysis samples satisfy several restrictions. First, samples of parcels are limited to residential lots whose area does not exceed 70,000 square feet. 11 Second, my analysis is restricted to census blocks (and the parcels therein) that had at least one resident at the 2010 decennial census. Boundary discontinuity samples further exclude parcels and blocks whose precinct boundaries span multiple school zones, State House, State Senate, or Congressional districts. I similarly exclude parcels and census blocks assigned to precinct boundaries delineated by ponds, streams of water, highways, railroads, large parks, reservations, cemeteries, and railroads. I also exclude boundaries between precincts assigned to the same polling location. To preserve sample comparability across elections, I restrict attention to boundaries whose precincts were assigned to vote at the same polling location during every election included in the sample. Finally, samples of census blocks exclude 129 8 For a review of the superior precision of address-point matching relative to alternative geocoding techniques, see Zandbergen (2008) . 9 For instance, I replace all abbreviations of street types ("ST," "AVE," etc.), as well as cardinal prefixes and suffixes ("N," "S," "E," "W") with their respective spelled-out versions. 10 Precisely in the context of distance to the polling place, McNulty et al. (2009) argue that Euclidean distance is preferable to more complicated measurement methods (e.g., Manhattan block grid or street distance). All methods examined by the authors display high correlation with one another, with Euclidean distance being easier to compute and interpret.
11 I determine residential type using land use codes from assessors files. I exclude overly large parcels to avoid the inclusion of huge residential projects and to make sure that distance from parcel centroids to polling places reliably proxies the distance voters face on Election Day. For comparison, an American football field covers an area of 57,600 square feet, inclusive of the two end zones. All results are substantively unaffected by alternative choices of the area threshold or by dropping the threshold altogether.
blocks where the number of cast ballots in one or more elections exceeds the 2010 VAP. 12 Similar restrictions apply to matching samples, which are thus limited to residential parcels smaller than 70,000 square feet, census blocks with one or more residents, and precincts that maintained the same polling location over the sample years. Figure A1 plots the distribution of distance to the polling place in the parcel sample. The average residential parcel has a distance of 0.365 mile to its polling place, with a standard deviation of 0.245. Because the sample consists of densely populated urban areas, the overwhelming majority of parcels are assigned to polling locations that are less than 0.5 mile away. 13
D Boundary Fixed Effects with Latitude-Longitude Interaction
Specification (1) can be modified to rely (almost) exclusively on the discontinuous change in distance to the polling place that occurs at the precinct borders. Following Dell (2010) ; Dell and Querubin (2018) and Gelman and Imbens (2018) , I augment regression (1) with boundary-specific linear polynomials in latitude and longitude:
where γ lat b(i) and γ
denote the boundary-specific coefficients on parcel i's latitude and longitude, respectively. These boundary-specific interactions are the RD polynomial, which controls for relevant factors (besides the treatment) that vary smoothly across precinct boundaries. I refer to equation 1 as the interacted specification. Table A1 shows that the simultaneous inclusion of boundary fixed effects and their linear interaction with latitude and longitude leaves essentially no residual variation in distance to the polling place, except at the discontinuities.
Because of the disaggregated level of analysis, the RD polynomial arguably plays a limited role in my setting compared to existing studies based on some version of equation 1. In my context, all boundaries are shorter than 1 mile, and the large sample size allows to restrict attention to parcels located within 0.05 mile of the nearest precinct boundary. Thus, there is limited geographic space for substantial within-boundary variation of correlates of voter participation other than distance 12 These are typically census blocks that contain large residential buildings constructed after 2010 (i.e., the year the decennial census was published). 13 A regression of distance to the polling place on boundary dummies yields a residual standard deviation of 0.17 mile. Adding boundary-specific linear polynomials in latitude and longitude reduces the residual standard deviation to 0.12 mile. Similarly, the residual standard deviation in the full matching sample is approximately 0.15 mile.
to the polling place. By contrast, Dell (2010) ; Dell and Querubin (2018); Ferwerda and Miller (2014) ; Fontana et al. (2016) compare observations that are several kilometers apart from each other and that are located on either side of boundaries spanning multiple provinces or regions.
Moreover, equation 1 requires explicitly estimating two controls -one for latitude, one for longitude -for each precinct boundary. As estimation samples include about four hundred precinct boundaries, the total number of controls in interacted specifications is large, thus reducing statistical power. At the same time, the number of lat-long controls grows with the number of boundaries (and hence with sample size), thus potentially complicating statistical inference (e.g., Cattaneo et al., 2018) . For these reasons, I limit the use of interacted specifications to robustness checks. Corroborating the limited role that the RD polynomial plays in my design, balancing tests (available upon request) and main results from interacted specifications are substantively in line with within-boundary estimates.
Because of the larger level of aggregation, the average precinct boundary in the census block sample contains far fewer observations than the average boundary in the parcel-level sample. Thus, to avoid issues of multicollinearity, the census block counterpart of regression 1 interacts latitude and longitude with city (instead of boundary) fixed effects.
E Placebo Regressions
In this appendix, I run placebo regressions to assess whether, even conditioning on boundary or matched-pair fixed effects, unobservable voter characteristics spuriously drive my impact estimates. Because balance checks in Tables 1 and 2 show that distance to the polling place is conditionally uncorrelated with parcel and block characteristics, omitted variable bias seems unlikely. Yet, maybe voters living close to the institutional buildings typically used as polling locations (e.g., schools, city halls) have higher sense of civic duty -and are thus more likely to vote -than those who live farther away, even if both sets of voters have the same education and income, on average. For example, teachers and public employees, who may have higher-than-average levels of civic engagement, may be more likely to live in proximity to schools or public buildings. To rule out this possibility, Table A2 reports estimates from regressions of the following forms:
where equations 2 and 3 refer to boundary fixed effects and matching specifications, respectively. The two regressions simply augment the corresponding original specifications with distance to the polling station of units on the opposite side of the precinct boundary: distOtherStation i .
To corroborate a causal interpretation of the main results, estimates of β should be virtually unaffected by the inclusion of distOtherStation i , while estimates of γ should be small and insignificant. By contrast, if voters living close to schools and municipal buildings have relatively higher civic duty -and thus higher propensities to vote, independently of whether they are actually assigned to vote at that specific polling location -, estimates of γ should be negative and significant.
Two observations are required to correctly interpret the results. First, controlling for distance to own polling place is crucial. If I simply replaced dist i with distOtherStation i , I would obtain positive and significant estimates. The reason is that the two measures are highly negatively correlated: within boundaries, moving away from one polling location means moving closer to the opposite polling place, on average. Second, because of the high correlation between dist i and distOtherStation i , controlling for both variables sharply reduces the treatment variation available to estimate effects (see bottom of Table A2 ). This is particularly true for matching specifications, which exploit within-pair treatment variation.
Reassuringly, controlling for distOtherStation i leaves within-boundary estimates of β (columns 1-4) virtually identical to the main estimates reported in Tables 3 and  4 . At the same time, the estimated effect of distance to the other polling place in the boundary is always small and insignificant. Matching specifications (columns 5-8) are less revealing, as including distOtherStation i renders the estimated β 's insignificant while the estimated γ's span large confidence intervals. But this is unsurprising in light of the minuscule variation that, conditioning on matched-pair fixed effects, remains to simultaneously estimate the effects of dist i and distOtherStation i . Overall, I find no evidence that my estimates are spuriously driven by unobservable correlates of living close to schools or polling places (independently of the actual assignment to vote at those sites).
F RD-Like Plots
Here, I present one-dimensional RD-like plots. Defining a one-dimensional running variable for within-boundary specifications is complicated. A possible candidate is distance to the boundary, assigning negative (positive) values to units that, within each boundary, fall on the side that is relatively closer (farther) to its respective polling station. However, maps are two-dimensional and whichever side is closer depends on the specific point used to compute distances to the two polling locations. Moreover, choosing an arbitrary point on the border (e.g., the midpoint of each border between voting precincts) may be misleading, as parcels and census blocks in the boundary may not concentrate around that point. Finally, even assuming there are sensible, non-arbitrary ways to define a running variable, it is not obvious how the resulting graphs would map to the within-boundary specifications presented in the paper.
These issues are largely absent in matching specifications: within each matched pair, there is always one unit that is relatively closer to its polling location, and one unit that is relatively farther. A natural running variable is thus distance to the matched unit (the negative of distance to the matched unit) for the unit that, within a pair, is relatively farther (closer) to its polling location.
Using this running variable, Figures A9 and A10 show that, within pairs, units that are relatively closer to polling places (left side of each plot) have markedly higher voter participation than units that are relatively farther (right side of each plot). To visualize the same variation captured by regression (2), the graphs plot residualized outcomes after partialling out matched-pair fixed effects. The solid red lines denote linear fits of residualized outcomes on the running variable, estimated separately on each side of a ±0.15-mile neighborhood around the discontinuity that separates closer (left) vs. farther (right) units. Point clouds represent sample means of plotted variables by (equally spaced) bins of the running variable, where the number of bins is based on Calonico et al. (2015) 's IMSE-optimal estimator.
Figures A11 and A12 plot residualized covariates. Except for distance to the polling place (panel A of the two figures), there are no systematic differences in covariates across the two sides of the discontinuity. Any differences are small in magnitude and consistent with the conditional exogeneity of distance to the polling place documented in the balancing exercises (Tables 1 and 2 ).
G Non-Linear Effects
In this appendix, I report estimates from regressions that replace distance to the polling place with indicators for non-overlapping ranges of distance. Using samples of units within .10 mile to the nearest precinct border/match, I estimate, respectively, within-boundary and matching specifications of the following forms: In Figure A13 , the estimated effects appear to grow linearly with distance to the polling place. The only possible exception is the seemingly "exponential" drop in participation going from 0.3-0.5mi to 0.5-0.75mi, which is particularly visible in census block regressions. This drop is perhaps explained by a combination of two factors. First, the maximum distance voters in my sample are willing to walk to cast a ballot may be in the 0.3-to-0.5 mile range. 14 Second, there may be a fixed cost associated with driving to the polls (e.g., the time necessary to find parking). If so, distances beyond walkability may induce a fraction of voters to drive instead of walking; at the same time, these distances may induce voters with large driving fixed costs to abstain entirely. Albeit noisier, patterns of matching estimates in Figure A14 are substantively in line with corresponding within-boundary estimates.
H Effects by Party Affiliation
Given the tight relationship between SES and party identification, larger effects in low-SES areas suggest that distance to the polling place could disproportionately affect more liberal voters. I test this hypothesis in my subsample of Massachusetts municipalities. Unlike Minnesota, Massachusetts features partisan voter registration, so every registered voter can be identified as a Republican, Democrat, independent, or third-party voter. Thus, separately for each election, I define three parcel-level outcomes: votes cast by registered Republicans, votes cast by registered Democrats, and votes cast by unaffiliated or third-party voters. In 2016, I also know who participated in the Democratic and Republican primaries, which lets me identify (at least indirectly) the political orientation of unaffiliated voters who turned out on Election Day. To exploit this extra information, outcomes for the 2016 presidential primaries are defined as the number of votes cast in the Republican and Democratic primaries. I then use Poisson equivalents of within-boundary specification 1 to regress these outcomes on distance to the polling place. Table  A10 reports the results.
In every election, proportional effects on votes cast by Democrats and unaffiliated/third-party voters share similar magnitude and precision. Their point estimates are roughly 15 log points, implying that a 1-mile increase in distance to the polling place reduces the number of ballots cast by Democrats and unaffiliated/third-party voters by approximately 15 percent. This contrasts with a small (or even positive, in 2014 and 2016) and mostly insignificant effect on votes cast by Republicans. Of course, very few voters in urban Massachusetts identify with the Republican party, resulting in only one vote cast by registered Republicans for every 10.9 cast by Democrats. This ideological imbalance is only partially attenuated in the 2016 election, whose outcomes are defined based on participation in party primaries (for every ballot cast in the Republican primary, there are 5.3 ballots cast in the Democratic primary). It is thus hardly surprising that estimates on votes cast by Republicans are much noisier than those based on Democratic or unaffiliated voters. With this admittedly important caveat in mind, I can reject equality of effects at the 5-percent level in 2014 and at the 10-percent level in 2016, while a joint test of equal proportional effects across the four elections is marginally significant.
I Effects by State
Does absentee voting alleviate the negative turnout effect of distance to the polling place? 15 To answer this question, I compare changes over time in Minneapolisspecific impact estimates with corresponding changes in Massachusetts-specific effects. Both Massachusetts and Minnesota required a valid excuse to vote absentee in 2012 and 2013. While Minnesota lifted this requirement in August 2014, Massachusetts retained it throughout 2016. Thus, assuming that changes in the effect of distance to the polling place in the Massachusetts subsample are a valid counterfactual for corresponding changes in Minneapolis, the effect of no-excuse absentee voting can be estimated via a Differences-in-Differences (DD) design. Separately for each election held 2012 through 2014, I estimate Poisson regressions of the following form:
where β MA and β MN denote state-specific proportional effects. 16 DD estimates, reported in Table A11 , are then computed as
where subscripts denote election years and BaselineY r is either of the two elections (2012 and 2013) in which both states required a valid excuse to vote absentee. Estimated proportional effects in the Massachusetts municipalities are remarkably stable across elections (respectively, −17.7, −18.1, and −15.1 log points in 2012, 2013, and 2014) . By contrast, Minneapolis estimates are larger in lowersalience municipal (−35.3 log points) and midterm (−21.5 log points) elections than in the 2012 presidential election (−11.2 log points). Despite the different magnitudes, I can never reject the hypothesis that, within each year, the effects are the same across the two states.
Proportional effects in Massachusetts are roughly constant across the three elections, while in Minneapolis, they are larger in 2013 than in the other years. Thus, signs of DD estimates depend on whether 2012 or 2013 is used as reference year. That is, the Minnesota-minus-Massachusetts difference in 2014 impact estimates (i.e., −0.215 + 0.151 = −0.064) is more pronounced than the corresponding 2012 gap (i.e., −0.112+0.177 = 0.065), but less so than the 2013 difference (i.e., −0.353+ 0.181 = −0.172). Of course, elections in the two states potentially differed along a number of dimensions (e.g., intensity of party mobilization efforts, coincident ballot measures, or minor races) that could have affected the relative salience of the distance effect. Additionally, Minnesota voters had no prior experience with no-excuse absentee voting and little time to learn about its availability. With these caveats in mind, insofar as no-excuse absentee voting does not appear to significantly mitigate the negative effect of distance to the polling place, I find inconclusive evidence of the short-run turnout-enhancing potential of this form of convenience voting.
J Efficient Redrawing of Precinct Boundaries: Technical Appendix
I formalize the reprecincting problem faced by election administrators as a generalized assignment problem (GAP, Fernández and Landete, 2015; Kundakcioglu and Alizamir, 2008) . In each city, a finite set of census blocks, J = {1, . . . , j, . . . , n}, must be optimally allocated to a finite, predetermined set of polling places, I = {1, . . . , i, . . . , m}. The set of census blocks assigned to a specific polling site constitutes a precinct. Let d j denote the service demand of census block j ∈ J. Associated with each polling site i ∈ I, q i denotes its maximum capacity. For each i ∈ I and j ∈ J, c i j is the cost of serving census block j through polling place i. To make the problem realistic and consistent with the regulations discussed in Section 1.1, I make the following assumptions:
1. Aggregation units: as implicit in the notation above, precincts must be constructed from aggregations of census blocks.
2. Polling locations: polling locations i ∈ I are those used in the November 2012 election. If x ≥ 1 precincts were assigned to vote at the same polling site, this site appears x times in the set of facilities. This establishes a one-toone relationship between polling places and precincts, so I use the two terms indistinctly. It also ensures that the resulting number of precincts m equals the number of precincts actually used in the 2012 presidential election and all elections thereafter.
3. Demands weights: census block j's demand, d j , is given by the total resident population as of the 2010 decennial census.
4. Capacity constraints: the maximum capacity of precinct i, q i , corresponds to the total population actually assigned to i after the 2010 decennial reprecincting.
5. Service costs: the cost of assigning census block j to polling station i is equal to the population-weighted travel distance from block j to station i. That is:
, where dist(i, j) denotes the j-to-i distance.
For each combination of block j ∈ J and polling station i ∈ I, I define the following decision variable:
x i j = 1 if census block j is assigned to precinct i 0 otherwise.
The integer programming formulation for the reprecincting problem is as follows:
Constraints 6 and 8 guarantee that each census block is entirely assigned to exactly one precinct, while constraint 7 ensures that precinct capacities are not exceeded. These assumptions are quite restrictive. In particular, since I have no direct knowledge of where election administrators might want to locate additional polling sites, if at all, existing polling locations and precinct capacities are taken as given. This creates potentially stringent limits to how much the optimal reprecincting problem can improve on existing precinct boundaries. Overall, I reckon my problem setup to be conservative, in the sense that it privileges realistic assumptions over the achievement of larger, but perhaps infeasible, efficiency gains.
Over the years, numerous approximation algorithms have been proposed for solving the GAP (see Kundakcioglu and Alizamir, 2008 for a review), which is NP-hard. Here, I use Esri ® ArcGIS Network Analyst Location-Allocation solver, which relies on a combination of heuristic (Teitz and Bart, 1968) and metaheuristic methods. 17 Column 1 of Table A12 reports the average census block-to-pollingplace distance (in miles). Column 2 shows the average difference between distance to the polling place in 2012 and the simulated distance that results from solving the efficient reprecincting problem. Averages are computed over the full census block sample (Panel A), and separately by blocks in areas with below-and above-median values of minority presence (Panel B), income (Panel C), and car availability (Panel D). The remaining columns (3 through 14) are divided into four groups, each representing a different election. Within each group, the first column reports the average census block turnout. The second column shows simulated turnout under efficient reprecincting, while the third details simulated turnout under a benchmark policy that eliminates the effect of distance to the polling place (or, equivalently, that removes distance to the polling place for all blocks Notes: These figures plot estimated parcel-level treatment effects based on boundary fixed effects, boundary effects with lat-long interactions, and matching specifications across different bandwidths (i.e., distance to the nearest precinct border or distance to the matched unit). Different panels correspond to different elections. Notes: These figures plot estimated block treatment effects based on boundary fixed effects, boundary fixed effects with lat-long interactions, and matching specifications across different bandwidths (i.e., distance to the nearest precinct border or distance to the matched unit). Different panels correspond to different elections. Notes: Using samples of matched parcels, these figures plot votes cast as a function of distance to the matched unit (or the negative thereof). Within each matched pair, the unit that is relatively closer to its polling place is assigned a negative value of distance to the match; the unit that is relatively farther to its polling place is assigned a positive value of distance to the match. Plotted variables are residualized after partialling out matched-pair fixed effects. Solid red lines are linear fits estimated separately on the two sides of the discontinuity. Shaded areas denote 95-percent confidence intervals. Point clouds are outcome means by (equally spaced) bins of the running variable, where the number of bins is based on Calonico et al. (2015) 's IMSE-optimal estimator. . Each panel reports estimates from four distinct regressions, one for each election. All regressions are matching specifications run on 0.10-mile-to-match samples that control for five mutually exclusive dummies corresponding to different ranges of distance to the polling place. The omitted category is distance to the polling place between 0 and 0.1 mile. 31 Notes: This table reports the R-squared from parcel-level regressions of distance to the polling place on boundary fixed effects (Panel A), boundary fixed effects and municipality-specific polynomials in latitude-longitude (Panels B, C, and D), and boundary fixed effects interacted with latitude-longitude (Panel E). Columns 4 through 6 are based on precinct boundaries that do not induce discontinuities in assignment to polling places; that is, parcels on either side of each boundary are assigned to vote at the same polling location. Notes: This table reports placebo estimates from regressions that simultaneously control for distance to own polling place and distance to the other polling place in a boundary (columns 1-4) or distance to the polling place of a parcel's/block's matched unit (columns 5-8). Each panel reports two standard deviations of distance to own polling place; namely, the residual standard deviation after controlling for all covariates included in the regression but distance to the other polling place in the boundary/match ("before controlling for other distance"), and the residual standard deviation controlling for all covariates including distance to the other polling place in the boundary/match ("after controlling for other distance"). Notes: This table reports estimates from boundary fixed effects OLS regressions that interact distance to the polling place with dummies for lower-and higher-thanmedian values of census block minority presence (Panel A), census block group median income (Panel B), and block group percentage of residential units without cars (Panel C). The null hypothesis of within-year F-tests is that the effect of distance to the polling place is the same across census blocks with higher-than-median and lower-than-median values of the interacting characteristic. The null hypothesis of across-years F-tests is that the effects are identical in every election. 
Notes:
Each cell reports estimates from a separate Poisson, boundary fixed effects regression estimated on the subsample of Massachusetts parcels. Outcomes in columns 1-6 are defined as the number of votes cast by parcel residents of a given partisan affiliation. Outcomes in columns 7 and 8 are the number of votes cast by parcel residents in a given presidential primary. The null hypothesis of within-year F-tests is that proportional effects are identical across party affiliations/primaries. The null hypothesis of across-years F-tests is that the effects are identical in every election. Notes: This table reports estimates from Poisson, boundary fixed effects regressions that interact distance to the polling place with state dummies. The null hypothesis of within-year F-tests is that the effects are identical across states. DD estimates of the effect of no-excuse absentee voting are reported below within-year F-tests.
